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I. INTRODUCTION
The efficiency of the common law generated discussion among legal
economists quite early in the law and economics literature.
The
controversial thesis was introduced by Judge Richard Posner in his seminal
book, Economic Analysis of Law.1 His main argument was that there is an
implicit economic logic to the common law.2 In his view, the doctrines in
common law provide a coherent and consistent system of incentives which
induce efficient behavior, not merely in explicit markets, but in all social
contexts (the so-called implicit markets).3 For example, common law
reduces transaction costs to favor market transactions when appropriate.4
Quite naturally, Judge Posner recognizes that not all doctrines in common
law are economically justifiable or even easy to understand from an
economic perspective.5 Economics does not offer a complete and exhaustive
theory of the common law, but his view is that it offers a balanced and
significant explanation.6
Judge Posner’s hypothesis can be traced back to the evolutionary theory
of the common law suggested by Justice Holmes in the 1880s.7 Holmes’s
main argument was that the judicial responses to public policy, rather than
some internal logic, drive development of the common law.8 According to
him, the ability of the common law to adjust appropriately to external needs
relied on the recruitment of the judiciary as representatives of the
community.9 Notably, Holmes’s theory vehemently opposed the codification
movement in the United States in those days.10 Justice Holmes did not use
an efficiency argument for the common law (and against codification).11
Although developed in a different historical background, Judge Posner’s
understanding of the common law is not very different from the theory
developed by Justice Holmes.
It is important to stress that the common law of Justice Holmes and Judge
Posner reflects the Blackstonian definition. According to Sir William
1

RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2011).
Id. at 315.
3
Id. at 315–20.
4
Id. at 315; see Anthony Niblett et al., The Evolution of a Legal Rule, 39 J. LEGAL STUD.
325 (2010) (discussing application of empirical testing of common law in commercial areas
converging to efficiency).
5
POSNER, supra note 1, at 320.
6
Id.
7
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1891).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Sheldon M. Novick, Introduction, in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW
(1991).
11
Id.
2
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Blackstone, writing in 1796, the common law consists of general customs by
which the judges and the courts are guided and directed.12 Alternatively, the
common law includes all legal doctrines that do not require a written form to
be valid but rather rely on the usage by courts.13 Therefore, statutes have a
secondary and subordinate role.14 They are essentially declaratory (to restate
the common law) or remedial (to correct the flaws of the common law).15
However, in American legal history, the Blackstonian understanding of
the common law has not been without controversies. For example, Justice
Cardozo saw clear advantages in the codification process and recognized
some advantages to the French legal method in shaping judgments.16 “The
American codification debate in the nineteenth century clearly shows that
there are multiple understandings of the role of the common law.”17 By
proposing the efficiency hypothesis of the common law, Judge Posner
noticeably opts for one side of the discussion. Unfortunately, most legal
economists have not realized that the Posnerian hypothesis has to be
understood in the context of a richer debate.18 Looking at the debates in the
past, the traditional arguments for the Blackstonian common law included
flexibility, stability, and ability to develop better rules without the need for
statutes.19 The conventional arguments against the Blackstonian common
law mentioned uncertainty (because of conflicting precedents), difficulty of
nonlawyers to understand the law (higher transaction costs in modern
economic language), and incorrectly allowing judges to legislate.20

12
THE COMMENTARIES OF SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, KNIGHT, ON THE LAWS AND
CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 1 (A.B.A., 2009).
13
Id.
14
Id. at 8.
15
Id.
16
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 143 (9th ed. 1937) (“No
doubt the ideal system . . . would be a code at once so flexible and so minute, as to supply in
advance for every conceivable situation the just and fitting rule.”).
17
Nuno Garoupa & Carlos Gómez Ligüerre, The Syndrome of the Efficiency of the
Common Law, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 287, 293–94 (2011).
18
See David S. Clark, Development of Comparative Law in the United States, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 175, 175–215 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard
Zimmermann eds., 2006), for a more detailed discussion about the influence of civil law in the
United States. See generally Andrew P. Morriss, Codification and Right Answers, 74 CHI.KENT L. REV. 355 (1999) (noting the debate surrounding codification of American law in the
nineteenth century).
19
See Morriss, supra note 18, at 376–77 (explaining that “code opponents argued that the
common law was elastic and flexible and so could adapt itself to new circumstances” and
“[i]ndeed, code opponents also claimed that the common law was simultaneously more stable
as well as more elastic than statutes”).
20
Id. at 369.
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Still,
Judge Posner’s hypothesis of the efficiency of the common law
begs for a more detailed explanation from the start. In particular,
the hypothesis lacks a more explicit [and consistent] mechanism
for explaining why the common law should be efficient. . . . [A]
remarkable literature emerged as a consequence.
Legal
economists proposed different [and ingenious] explanations that
have been evolutionary models identifying the forces that have
shaped the common law to generate efficient rules.21
“[I]f the common law is evolutionarily efficient, we are left with no
explanation for the important doctrinal differences across common law
jurisdictions . . . .”22 One of the many problems with the economic literature
on this topic is the confusing use of “common law” to describe different legal
features. Our definition is the standard one: “a body of general rules
prescribing social conduct,” originally enforced by the ordinary royal courts
in England (as opposed to equity, local, or ecclesiastical courts), and
characterized by the development of its own principles in actual legal
controversies (through the use of judicial precedents), by the procedure of
trial by jury, and by the doctrine of the supremacy of law (all agencies of
government are subject to court review and compelled to follow legal
procedure such as due process).23
A. Development of the Common Law
The development of the common law in the thirteen colonies followed
different paths that were not only distinct from the original English common
law, but also between the colonies themselves.24 Unlike in the English
tradition, colonial law tended to be codified with the exception of
Maryland.25 Some of these colonial law codes departed significantly from
the English common law, in particular in New England (Massachusetts most
importantly) and Pennsylvania.26 In other cases, such as Virginia and the
21
Garoupa & Ligüerre, supra note 17, at 294 (internal citations omitted). See generally Paul
H. Rubin, Micro and Macro Legal Efficiency: Supply and Demand, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 19,
21–27 (2005) (providing an example of the evolutionary models as applied to common law).
Explanations are discussed in detail in the following pages of this Article. See infra notes 77–79.
22
Garoupa & Ligüerre, supra note 17, at 296.
23
ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 178–79 (1966).
24
PAUL SAMUEL REINSCH, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN COLONIES 9
(1899).
25
Id. at 53.
26
Nevertheless, there were standard provisions to ensure that colonial law would not be
radically in conflict with English common law. Id.
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Carolinas, English law was influential in adjudication, for example, but
subsidiary to colonial law.27 In a show of the general respect for self rule,
appeals from colonial courts to the English Privy Council were generally not
allowed and drastically discouraged.28 Thus, it was not English common
law, but these local departures that shaped the general reasoning and
principles of American common law.29
All the same, it is unquestionable that the English common law
influenced and formed the American common law.30 No doubt there were
political and economic factors helping the convergence with English law.31
But the very different realities faced by the colonies and the metropolis led to
significant departures from the English common law in many fields of law,
notably property (including inheritance, alienability, and trespass), contracts
(including remedies and restitution), torts (from negligence rules to
proximate causation), slavery laws, and family (marriage and divorce
rules).32
In fact, we could describe the early stages of American common law
more accurately by recognizing the existence of thirteen different legal
systems with different degrees of codification (quite significant in
Massachusetts due to the Puritan distrust of lawyers).33 English law was
important more in the sense of providing a background and legal method
than the elements of substantive law.34 The situation changed in the
eighteenth century, when colonial courts became more English in nature.35
The British developed more interventionist methods of governing the
colonies, which resulted in a strengthening of the executive power.36
Although the British did not opt for a model of giving the courts in London
jurisdiction over colonial courts, the role of the Privy Council was
enhanced.37 Colonial statute law was subject to review by the Privy

27

Id. at 54.
But see MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION (2004) (describing
Rhode Island’s struggle to prevent the private appeal to the Privy Council).
29
REINSCH, supra note 24 (noting that the circumstances of the colonies influenced them to
depart from English common law); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
(2005).
30
JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 874 (2009).
31
Id. at 878.
32
See id. at 873–921 (cataloging the differences between the English and American
common law by subject).
33
FRIEDMAN, supra note 29. Many colonial statutes have not been studied by modern legal
historians because they have disappeared. See, for example, the recent discovery of the Laws
and Liberties of Massachusetts from 1648.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
28
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Council.38 A process of convergence in substance and style was imposed by
the Privy Council.39 Yet frequent delays and the permissive attitude of the
Council (more political than truly judicial) undermined the possibility of full
conformity of the colonial courts by the time of independence.40
Similar trends are found in other common law jurisdictions, such as
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Ireland.41 Their common law systems
have been formed and shaped by the English common law. Yet local
determinants and different historical events have effected important
departures from the original law in significant areas.42
B. Local Determinants of the Common Law and Legal Origins
This Article assesses the efficiency of the common law hypothesis to
detect the possible explanations for those main differences. If local
determinants shape the common law differently, the literature needs to
address these particularities that have been largely ignored.
The
consequence is that there might be no single efficient outcome, thus
undermining the “one-size-fits-all” theory of the legal origins literature.43
Alternatively, it could be the case that the common law only converges to
efficiency under some conditions that could be undermined by specific local
determinants.
In a different paper, we have already criticized the one-size-fits-all theory
proposed by the legal origins literature.44 In that paper, we have provided a
methodological critique of recent work by legal economists that emphasizes
the superiority of the common law system over French civil law. We argued
there that such an approach was based on a selected “cherry-picking” of legal
doctrines and macro-generalizations that lack a serious theoretical
framework.45 In that article, we articulated our skepticism concerning the
38

Id.
Id.
40
Id.
41
See HOGUE, supra note 23, at 235 (explaining that the common law is the root of the
legal systems in all past British colonies).
42
See MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 114–21 (2d ed.
1716) (detailing the specific divergence of the Irish common law from that of the English).
43
See Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right,
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 504–05 (2001) (positing that the common law creates quicker growth
because of stronger property and contract rights. The most critical claim is against French law
since other civil law systems—German and Scandinavian—perform at least as well as
common law); see also Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins,
46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 326–27 (2008) (explaining the theory of legal origins). See
generally Gani Aldashev, Legal Institutions, Political Economy, and Development, 25
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 257 (2009) (surveying different legal origins research).
44
Garoupa & Ligüerre, supra note 17, at 288.
45
Id.
39
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possibility of a sophisticated theory to sustain the superiority of the common
law legal family.46
This Article reinforces our skepticism. It seems clear that the common
law adjusts to local determinants that vary across the world, therefore
producing different doctrines and legal outcomes. This argument contributes
by further casting doubt on the selected cherry-picking methodology of the
legal origins literature and the corresponding macro-generalizations. If the
common law of a certain field, such as property or contracts, produces
significantly different doctrines depending on local determinants, it is
unclear which cherry-picked doctrine is being used to distinguish the
common law from other legal families. A light version of the one-size-fitsall theory could suggest that not all rules across common law jurisdictions
are actually efficient. Rather, the legal origins literature proposes that the
model for creating rules (but not the substantive laws) is the same across
common jurisdictions and more efficient than alternative methods (even if
the substantive rules may turn out to be very different looking). The problem
with this version is, as we show, the indeterminacy of the outcome. The
empirical analysis employed by the one-size-fits-all theory focuses on the
rules and doctrines, not the mechanisms.
In our work, we look primarily to the area of torts because the differences
across common law jurisdictions have been widely perceived to be relevant
to determine economic efficiency (even if it is unclear that tort law in
particular actually increases the efficiency of the law).47 Quite importantly,
we want to focus on asymmetric developments of the common law based on
case law, rather than those imposed by statute law. For example, there are
significant differences in the way common law jurisdictions treat class or
group litigation. However, many of these differences are explained by
statute law in the United States,48 Australia,49 England and Wales,50 and
Canada,51 notwithstanding the significant influence of judge-made law.52 A
46

Id. at 289.
See, e.g., Yoram Barzel, Dispute and Its Resolution: Delineating the Economic Role of
the Common Law, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 238 (2000) (arguing the efficiency of common law
in contracts and property, but not in torts).
48
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
49
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt IV(a) (Austl.). This part came into force by
the passage of the Federal Court of Australia Amendment Act 1991 (Cth) s 3 (Austl.).
50
Civil Procedure Rules, 1998, S.I. 1998/3132, R. 19-19.15 (U.K.).
51
Class Proceedings Act, S.O. 1992, c. 6 (Can.); Class Proceedings Act 1996, R.S.B.C.
1996, c. 50 (Can.); Class Actions Act, S.N.L. 2001, C-18.1 (Can.); Class Actions Act, S.S.
2001, c. C-12.01 (Can.); Class Proceedings Act, S.M. 2002, c. 14 (Can.); Class Proceedings
Act, S.A. 2003, c. C-16.5 (Can.).
52
The English case law concerning the application of civil procedure rules to group
litigation was influential, among others, in Australian and Canadian statute law going back to
the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873. The role of the English Court of Appeal in
47
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similar remark can be made in the context of the common law presumption
of individual rights, with Australia being the outstanding exception,53 while
the United Kingdom,54 United States,55 Canada,56 and New Zealand57 have
developed important statutory law.
Property law is also a remarkable illustration in this context.58 Created by
courts, property rights are always conveyed as a result of an exchange among
people. It is both important to determine who owns the right to control a
certain resource or a specific good and to discover the ability of the owner to
transmit or limit the use of the resource. The problem is common to movable
as well as real estate property. In the latter case, given the costs and the use
as collateral in modern economics, it is more relevant to identify the owner
and to know the legal status of the property in order to protect purchasers. It
is easy to understand that, in every legal system, a great part of the rules
governing real estate property is intended to promote a reliable way to
convey and exchange property. The main goal involves the protection of
potential purchasers and their abilities to get loans. As it is well-known, real
estate security and stability play a role of the utmost importance in economic
growth.
The Torrens system of land registration was developed in the nineteenth
century in Australia.59 It was later implemented in New Zealand, Western
Canada, and other British possessions.60 However, in many areas of Britain
(mainly Scotland and Ireland), Canada, and the United States, a traditional
developing appropriate procedures for multiparty litigation has been noticed by legal scholars.
In this matter, see the discussion in RACHAEL MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON
LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS (2004).
53
Australia has no Bill of Rights. Individual rights have been expanded by the case law of
the Australian High Court. See generally James Allan, You Don’t Always Get What You Pay
For: No Bill of Rights for Australia, 24 N.Z. U. L. REV. 179 (2010).
54
Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W & M., c. 2 (Eng.); Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.); see
David Erdos, Ideology, Power Orientation and Policy Drag: Explaining the Elite Politics of
Britain’s Bill of Rights Debate, 44 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 20 (2009) (framing the Human
Rights Act as part of a Bill of Rights agenda).
55
U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.
56
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.).
57
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990; see David Erdos, Aversive Constitutionalism in the
Westminster World: The Genesis of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (1990), 5 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 343 (2007) (demonstrating the aversive model of constitutionalization of rights in
established democrasies); David Erdos, Judicial Culture and the Politicolegal Opportunity
Structure: Explaining Bill of Rights Legal Impact in New Zealand, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 95
(2009) (arguing that New Zealand bill of rights case law has been largely confined to criminal
or freedom of speech issues, a culture established from British judicial norms).
58
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (3d ed. 2011).
59
THEODORE B.F. RUOFF, AN ENGLISHMAN LOOKS AT THE TORRENS SYSTEM 1–2 (1957).
60
John L. McCormack, Torrens and Recording: Land Title Assurance in the Computer
Age, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 61, 95 (1992).
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system of land recording has persisted.61 The main difference between these
two title systems is that registration generates a provisional priority for
claims, whereas recording does not.62 As a consequence, in the case of a
valid claim by a third party, the current owner keeps the land under
registration (the rightful claimant gets compensated by the public system of
registration), whereas under recording the current owner loses the land (but
usually receives compensation if an insurance mechanism is in place).
Recording and registration have been shaped by judge-made law, but the
Torrens system was not introduced by the courts.63 A similar analysis can be
developed for adverse possession. The traditional common law approach to
adverse possession has been changed by important legislation in the United
Kingdom,64 where significant differences are now observable.65
C. The Role of Statute Law
One immediate explanation for observed differences across common law
countries could be the asymmetric role of statute law.66 Even if statutory law
prevails over judge-made law in all common law jurisdictions today, such
61

Id. at 129 n.5.
Benito Arruñada, Property Enforcement as Organized Consent, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
401, 420–21 (2003); Benito Arruñada & Nuno Garoupa, The Choice of Titling System in
Land, 48 J.L. & ECON. 709, 711 (2005); Benito Arruñada, Property Titling and Conveyancing,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 237, 240–44 (Harry Smith &
Ken Ayotte eds., 2010); Garoupa & Ligüerre, supra note 17, at 312–13 (“The alleged
superiority of the registration system is not immune to criticism. Registration helps property
transactions, as well as the use of property as collateral, by reducing uncertainty. However, it
is a more expensive and demanding system because the cost of purging titles is not negligible.
Consequently, it could be that a more expensive system, such as registration, expels an
important fraction of property from the public system. On the other hand, recording is a
cheaper titling system, and therefore the fraction of property expelled from the public system
is presumably lower. Clearly, there is a trade-off between the assurance of quality of titling in
land and the expulsion of property from the public system. From a theoretical perspective, it
is not clear which titling system is better for the enforcement of property rights.”).
63
RUOFF, supra note 59.
64
Land Registration Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 21 (Eng.); Land Registration Act, 2002,
c. 9 (Eng.).
65
See Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, An Economic Theory of Adverse Possession, 15
NT
I ’L REV. L. & ECON. 161 (1995) (discussing the underlying economic rationale of the
adverse possession doctrine); Todd Barnet, The Uniform Registered State Land and Adverse
Possession Reform Act, a Proposal for Reform of the United States Real Property Law, 12
BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2004) (analyzing the Land Registration Acts of 1925 and 2002 and other
aspects of the U.K. registration system); Barbara Bogusz, Bringing Land Registration into the
Twenty-First Century — The Land Registration Act 2002, 65 MOD. L. REV. 556 (2002)
(analyzing the effects of the Land Registration Act of 2002); Amnon Lehavi, The Property
Puzzle, 96 GEO. L.J. 1987 (2008) (analyzing the effects of the Land Registration Act of 2002).
66
See Priya P. Lele & Mathias M. Siems, Diversity in Shareholder Protection in Common
Law Countries, J. INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONS, Spring 2007, at 3 (discussing differences in
shareholder protection law among common law countries).
62

2012]

THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMON LAW AND EFFICIENCY

317

preponderance varies. In that case, the potential inefficiencies could be
possibly unrelated to the common law itself; in particular, if we take the view
suggested by legal economists that statute law is intrinsically less efficient
than judge-made law.67 In fact, one of the main arguments for the superiority
of judge-made law is that private interests are more likely to capture the
legislature than the courts, although we think that such argument is debatable
at the theoretical as well as at the empirical level.68 From our perspective
there is no systematic evidence that rent-seeking is more persistent with the
legislature than with the courts, since demand and supply conditions are
fundamentally different.69 Moreover, courts and legislators have their own
goals in terms of enhancing their influence, which complicates the potential
effect of private interests in lawmaking.70 However, we recognize that using
statute law as the main source to explain differences across common law
jurisdictions would be self-defeating in the eyes of those who believe in the
efficiency hypothesis of the common law.
Our approach in this Article does not mean we reject the view held by
other legal scholars that the interaction of judge-made law and statute law
might actually improve rather than hurt convergence for efficiency. Most
likely an appropriate mix of judicial precedent and statute rule should be the
efficient outcome.71 Otherwise, given the growth of statute law in all
67
See Andreas Engert & D. Gordon Smith, Unpacking Adaptability, 2009 BYU L. REV.
1553, 1562 (stating that “increasing the adaptability of the law—and hence making the law
less predictable—is not a general policy advice to enhance overall efficiency”).
68
See Michael A. Crew & Charlotte Twight, On the Efficiency of Law: A Public Choice
Perspective, 66 PUB. CHOICE 15 (1990) (arguing that common law is less subject to rentseeking than statute law); see also Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL
STUD. 205 (1982) (arguing that both common law and statute law are influenced by private
interests to advance their goals). The most devastating criticism is GORDON TULLOCK, THE
CASE AGAINST THE COMMON LAW (1997) and Gordon Tullock, Rent-Seeking and the Law, in 5
THE SELECTED WORKS OF GORDON TULLOCK 184 (Charles K. Rowley ed., 2005). See also
Todd J. Zywicki, Spontaneous Order and the Common Law: Gordon Tullock’s Critique, 135
PUB. CHOICE 35 (2008) (examining comparative attributes of the common and civil law
systems).
69
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975); W. Mark Crain & Robert D. Tollison,
Constitutional Change in an Interest-Group Perspective, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1979); W.
Mark Crain & Robert D. Tollison, The Executive Branch in the Interest-Group Theory of
Government, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 555 (1979); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent
Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987) (discussing
several theories of capture in rulemaking); Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory
Justify Judicial Activism After All?, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219 (1997); Howard S.
Erlanger & Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political Faith, 22 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 959 (1997).
70
A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of
Tradition’s Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. REV. 409, 447–48 (1999).
71
For a technical model, see Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law
Versus Statute Law: An Evolutionary Comparison, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (2008) (predicting
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common law jurisdictions, the obvious conclusion should be that the overall
efficiency has been reduced considerably in recent times.72 The argument
that the efficiency of the common law is not really demand-side induced (i.e.,
through the incentives provided by litigation) but supply-side induced
reinforces this drastic conclusion. According to this version, the historical
competition between common law and equity courts was the driving force;
once these courts were merged and a monopoly had been achieved, the
efficiency forces had lost stimulus.73
Still, for the purpose of clarifying our arguments, both in the theoretical
discussion as well as in the examples we consider, we have intentionally
excluded the role of statute law as far as we can. In other words, we focus
primarily on doctrinal and rule diversity fostered by judge-made law.
D. Choice of Common Law Jurisdictions
Our discussion focuses on “pure” common law jurisdictions such as the
United States (neglecting Louisiana for the purpose of the paper), Canada
(excluding Quebec in our analysis), England and Wales, Ireland, Australia or
New Zealand. The reason is to make sure the observed relevant differences
are not induced by other elements of the legal system that prevail in “mixed”
jurisdictions such as Israel or South Africa (by no means do we underplay
the potential influence of Quebecois civil law in Canadian common law).74
the progressive convergence of common and civil law toward a mixed system); Carmine
Guerriero, Democracy, Judicial Attitudes, and Heterogeneity: The Civil Versus Common Law
Tradition (Univ. Cambridge, Working Paper No. 917, 2008) (arguing that case law
outperforms statute law when political institutions are weak).
72
See Rubin, supra note 21, at 23 (noting that the common law might have been more
efficient in the past when the organization of interests was more costly, but not now). Also,
these arguments face a serious challenge in areas such as antitrust law that might be statute
law precisely because the traditional principle of fair trade in common law did not protect
market competition and courts were excessively deferential to monopolies. THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995).
73
See generally Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A
Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551 (2003) (arguing for supply-side explanations
based on competition between several court systems, in particular common law and equity).
A more comprehensive discussion is provided by Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition
and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179 (2007), who argues that
institutional structures that were able to produce more innovative legal rules tended to prevail
in English law. However, he challenges the efficiency of the supply-side competition between
these courts. He notes that there was a pro-plaintiff bias that generated certain (hardly
efficient) rules given the way judges were paid. Important changes to judicial compensation
and salaries corrected the pro-plaintiff bias in the nineteenth century.
74
See, e.g., Esin Örücü, General Introduction: Mixed Legal Systems at New Frontiers, in
MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS AT NEW FRONTIERS (Esin Örücü ed., 2010); Vernon Valentine Palmer,
Two Rival Theories of Mixed Legal Systems, in MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS AT NEW FRONTIERS,
supra.

2012]

THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMON LAW AND EFFICIENCY

319

At the same time, we prefer to frame our discussion in the context of those
jurisdictions rather than the American states (as well as the Canadian
provinces or the Australian states) because it seems more appropriate when
having in mind the current mathematical models of the evolution of the
common law. Clearly there are important variations in common law within
the American states. At the same time, given that they belong to a political
union and are subject to identical federal law as well as the jurisdiction of the
U.S. Supreme Court, there is an inevitable contamination effect that shapes
convergence. It seems to us that jurisdictions that are not part of the same
political and institutional unit provide for a better testing of our predictions.
The following Part discusses the origins of the efficiency hypothesis of
the common law and the relevant variables to explain differences across
common law jurisdictions fostered by case law. In Part III, we discuss
examples of legal doctrines and rules that seem to be addressed differently
across the common law world. Part IV concludes the paper.
II. THE EFFICIENCY OF THE COMMON LAW HYPOTHESIS
If the common law is to be efficient, certainly there must be strong
reasons to support such an assertion. One immediate explanation for the
Posnerian hypothesis is that judges have a preference for efficiency.75 If
judges pursue efficiency as the goal of law, it is no surprise that the common
law is efficient. However, this does not seem to be a persuasive argument.
Why would judges care about efficiency rather than equality or other
possible goals? Moreover, from an empirical perspective, we now have an
extensive literature showing that ideology and other significant
nonefficiency-oriented variables play a major role in explaining judicial
behavior.76
From a comparative perspective, the argument is also
unpersuasive since there seems to be no strong reason for why American
judges would care more or less about efficiency than Canadian or Australian
judges.
A second possible explanation is that efficiency is promoted by the
prevalence of precedent (more efficient rules are more likely to survive
through a mechanism of precedent).77 Another explanation relies on the
incentives to bring cases and the role of court litigation (since inefficient
rules are not welfare-maximizing).78 Nevertheless, these two explanations
75
Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103
(1979).
76
See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257 (2005)
(arguing political ideology of members of the judiciary help explain judicial behavior).
77
Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 53 (1977).
78
George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 65, 65 (1977).
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require a particular mix of case litigation in order to derive an efficient
outcome. In particular, variations concerning the prevalence of precedent
(that traditionally was stronger in England than in America) and the mix of
case litigation could explain differences across the common law world.
However, it is unclear if such variations or differences indicate that the
common law only achieves efficiency under some specific conditions.
In fact, the search for a more convincing setup for the efficiency of the
common law hypothesis has sparked important academic work. This
literature essentially looks at how litigation improves the law, or some
specific legal doctrine, taking into consideration that only a self-selected
number of cases is actually litigated.79
The efficiency of the common law must be unequivocally related to the
observation that litigation follows private interests.80 Presumably it is true
that bad rules are challenged more often than good rules, so naturally court
intervention could improve the overall quality of the law. However, this line
of reasoning is not without problematic shortcomings. It could be that the
subset of cases that are actually litigated are not representative enough to
trigger the necessary improvements, hence biasing evolution of legal rules
against efficiency.81 Furthermore, the emergence of efficiency in common
law necessarily depends on a number of factors in the evolutionary
mechanism, namely initial conditions, path dependence, and random
shocks.82
79
See John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 393, 394 (1978) (arguing that the probability that a particular litigant will win a
favorable decision); Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law
without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 156 (1980) (arguing “the law can improve
by an unguided evolutionary process”); R. Peter Terrebonne, A Strictly Evolutionary Model of
Common Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 397 (1981); PAUL H. RUBIN, BUSINESS FIRMS AND THE
COMMON LAW (1983); Georg von Wagenheim, The Evolution of Judge-Made Law, 13 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 381 (1993); Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Litigation and the Evolution of
Legal Remedies: A Dynamic Model, 116 PUB. CHOICE 419 (2003); Vincy Fon et al.,
Litigation, Judicial Path-Dependence, and Legal Change, 20 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 43 (2005);
Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A Dynamic
Analysis, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 519 (2006); FRANCESCO PARISI & VINCY FON, THE
ECONOMICS OF LAWMAKING (2009); MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC
CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 464 (2009); Niblett et al., supra note 4, at 325
(showing empirically that rules fail to converge with significant inconsistencies across states);
Anthony Niblett, Do Judges Cherry Pick Precedents to Justify Extra-Legal Decisions?: A
Statistical Examination, 70 MD. L. REV. 234 (2010). A critical view of this literature is
provided by FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 103–23 (2009).
80
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication As a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 235 (1979) (making the point that judicial opinions are a public good that arbitration
fails to provide).
81
Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583, 612–14
(1992).
82
Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 641
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More recent work has provided a more comprehensive analytical
framework to show under which precise mathematical conditions the
evolution of the common law tends toward efficiency.83 For example, even
if judges are ultimately efficiency-seeking, precedent and overruling must be
balanced in an appropriate way. A judicial bias might distort the law in the
short run but at the same time provide the mechanism to improve the law in
the long run, depending on critical elements of the evolution of the common
law.84 The possibility of selective litigation driven by private interests (likely
to be misaligned with social interests) just makes the whole process more
complex; convergence to efficiency is still possible as long as the biases are
not overwhelming to the point of hurting the likelihood that inefficient laws
will be more often litigated. Naturally strong precedent could be socially
valuable if judges are significantly biased.85
If the Posnerian hypothesis is true, at least in the long run, rules that do
not promote efficient results should be repealed in any common law
jurisdiction.86 Therefore, the central question is why common law
jurisdictions have different doctrines in property, contracts, and torts. When
common law jurisdictions have a different doctrine in a particular relevant
area of the law there could be two possible interpretations. The first
interpretation is that the evolution of the common law to efficiency generates
multiple equilibria. Therefore, each common law jurisdiction is potentially
efficient and there are multiple efficient doctrines depending on local
determinants. The second interpretation is that there is one and only one
(1996). For an explanation of path dependence theory, see Oona A. Hathaway, Path
Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System,
86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 606 (2001) (outlining what she considers to be three strands of path
dependency).
83
See, e.g., Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of Common Law, 115 J.
POL. ECON. 43, 46 n.4 (2007) (discussing following precedent, distinguishing and overruling
as leading or not leading to efficiency).
84
See id.; Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, Overruling and the Instability of Law, 35 J.
COMP. ECON. 309, 323 (2007) (noting that although inefficient laws are more easily litigated and
replaced, which improves efficiency over time, this effect can still reduce the long run volatility
of the law because it cannot ensure convergence to efficiency); Anthony Niblett, Case-By-Case
Adjudication and the Path of the Car 184 (Mar. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (available at
http://works.bepress.com/Anthony_niblett/1/) (arguing that polarization concerning precedent
depends on judicial preferences, cases that get litigated, and cost of adhering to precedent).
85
See Thomas J. Miceli, Legal Change: Selective Litigation, Judicial Bias, and Precedent,
38 J. LEGAL STUD. 157, 165 (2009) (stating that “binding precedent plays no role in enhancing
the efficiency of the law, but it can play a potentially important role in limiting the ability of
biased judges to drive the law in an inefficient direction”); Luca Anderlini et al., Why Stare
Decisis? (Working Paper, 2010) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616708) (arguing that
stare decisis guarantees ex ante efficient decisions).
86
See Gennaioli & Shleifer, supra note 83, at 45 (referring to the Priest and Rubin theories
“that disputes involving inefficient legal rules are more likely to be taken to court” and thus
replaced “by better ones over time”).
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efficient equilibrium, and many common law jurisdictions simply fail to
achieve it. We use the analytical models developed in the law and
economics literature to identify the two possibilities and understand the
implications.87 Quite the contrary, these possibilities are not mutually
exclusive. Hence, we conclude this Part by addressing the more realistic
model which allows for the coexistence of both interpretations.
A. Multiple Efficient Equilibria
When the fundamentals of the model vary across jurisdictions, we could
have multiple efficient equilibria. Each jurisdiction converges to an efficient
doctrine and rule in the long run, but they are not the same because there are
local conditions and aspects that vary significantly.88
The process of convergence to an efficient and stable equilibrium is based
on selective litigation. The selective litigation could be different across the
common law world in response to local conditions and asymmetric shocks
caused by local historical events. The circumstances under which an original
rule or doctrine in common law is applied in different jurisdictions varies
dramatically, since different sets of cases are litigated. As a consequence,
the conditional probability that a given inefficient rule is challenged is not
the same.89 Therefore, the evolution of the common law follows different
paths. Of necessity, the pattern of path dependence will be consistently
diverse leading to distinctive, but equally efficient, equilibria.90
Legal historians seem to perceive this effect in explaining the
development of the English common law and the early American common
law. Colonial law responded mainly to local problems and conditions faced
by the European settlers, which were radically distinct from the realities of
the English (and possibly the Irish) society.91 However, relying on these
differences that resulted in dissimilar selective litigation to explain
significant variations across the American colonies, Canada, Australia and
New Zealand seems less persuasive.
87
In particular, we focus on Gennaioli & Shleifer, supra note 83; Miceli, supra note 85;
Ponzetto & Fernandez, supra note 71; and Wagenheim, supra note 79.
88
Gennaioli & Shleifer, supra note 84, at 323–47.
89
See Miceli, supra note 85 (arguing that the rate of creation of inefficient rules depend
upon the strength of governing precedent); Wagenheim, supra note 79.
90
See Roe, supra note 82, at 647–48 n.11 (stating that in applying a path dependency
model when there are multiple results, one outcome need not be better than the other because
each could have been good enough, where the author uses a weak-path dependency to indicate
multiple equilibria); Hathaway, supra note 82, at 634–35 (using the rule against perpetuities as
an example of how the rule developed because of history and that its existence, while
explainable, was not necessarily a unique equilibrium, indicating that given other
circumstances an equally efficient alternative rule may have been possible).
91
FRIEDMAN, supra note 29.
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If there are multiple efficient equilibria due to distinctive selective
litigation, the implications for the efficiency hypothesis of the common law
are twofold. First, the one-size-fits-all approach taken by the legal origins
literature is undermined. There is no single or unique common law as
assumed by that literature, but a multiplicity of common law systems. The
focus on a particular doctrine or rule is not very informative concerning the
efficiency of legal arrangements, since the appropriate response varies across
the common law jurisdictions. Second, under the efficiency hypothesis of
the common law, when a particular jurisdiction adopts the common law
approach as suggested by the legal origins literature, the “efficient” outcome
is difficult to predict since particular local determinants might generate yet
another completely new path.92
Multiple efficient equilibria signal that the world is more complex than
the approach taken by the legal origins literature. A mistaken focus on legal
outcomes hides the interaction of different local determinants with dissimilar
path dependencies. Under the current analytical models, the assessment of
legal outcomes concerning efficiency cannot be disentangled from the
varying selective litigation in each jurisdiction; certainly that has not been
the approach taken by the legal origins literature.
B. Single Efficient Equilibrium
Another possibility is that there is a single efficient equilibrium.
Immediately we recognize that some common law jurisdictions seem to
develop the efficient doctrine or rule, whereas others do not. There are
several possible explanations for why some common law jurisdictions fail to
achieve efficiency.
One possible reason is that the distribution of relevant attributes of
judicial preferences is not the same.93 For example, the proportion of proplaintiff and pro-defendant judges varies, with the consequence that the
number of pro-efficient rule judges is different, and in some cases
insufficient to force convergence to efficiency.94 Alternatively, the biases
92

See generally Hathaway, supra note 82, at 634–35 (in explaining how the rule of
perpetuities exemplifies increasing path dependence, stating that despite being able to
ascertain how the rule of perpetuities came into existence, the final outcome selecting that
approach would have been difficult to predict in advance and that given another set of
historical circumstances the rules governing inheritance could have developed differently).
93
See Gennaioli & Shleifer, supra note 84, at 316 (claiming that the optimal (efficient)
legal rule should be unbiased and that unless all judges are unbiased (which they are not),
judge made law cannot achieve this outcome).
94
See Miceli, supra note 85, at 163 (assuming that precedent continues to be nonbinding,
judges will decide cases that come before theme based solely on these preferences, meaning
pro-plaintiff judges will uphold pro-plaintiff cases and overrule pro-defendant cases and vice
versa).
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favoring certain types of rules vary across the population of judges. In
particular, more polarized judiciaries are less likely to achieve efficient
doctrines and rules.95 Efficiency requires a more unbiased judiciary and
therefore more judicial polarization leads to significant social welfare
losses.96 At the same time, a varying degree of influence of special interest
groups in judicial politics could contribute toward shaping behavior in
different ways that preclude some particular institutional arrangements from
converging to efficiency.97 Moreover, the concern about the future evolution
of the law measured by a specific discount factor (for example, how forward
looking judges are) plays an important role in explaining efficiency. A
judiciary too focused on the short run and less so on the long run is less
likely to generate an efficient legal outcome.98
There are good reasons to think that the distribution of relevant judicial
attributes varies across common law jurisdictions, with the U.S. judiciary
probably being distinct from other common law judiciary.99 From the
perspective of the current available models, these differences could be a byproduct of specific appointment mechanisms (that can polarize the judiciary
or empower the influence of special interest groups), judicial tenure
(including mandatory retirement), promotion and retention policies, or
recruitment strategies (a wider or narrower pool of potential candidates to the
judiciary that breeds different degrees of heterogeneity in the bench). The
most interesting implication of these considerations is that most probably the
U.S. is the jurisdiction with the least likely judiciary (within the common law
jurisdictions) to promote efficient legal outcomes according to the
mathematical models.
Another reason for why some common law jurisdictions fail to converge
to efficiency is the role of precedent. If the cost of changing precedent is too
low, judicial biases prevail and the legal outcome in the long run is unlikely
to be efficient.100 To put it differently, the judicial gains from getting closer
to an efficient outcome are insufficient when it is easy to change
95

Gennaioli & Shleifer, supra note 84, at 311, 315.
Id. at 313.
97
See Ponzetto & Fernandez, supra note 71, at 398 (identifying that judges are subject to
additional pressures like those from interest groups and as a result their decisions are more
variable than legislation because they depend not only society-wide general and special
interests but also the interests of the parties appearing before them in court).
98
Id. at 382 (claiming that in the long run the dynamic properties of judge-made law make
it an average more efficient).
99
See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN THE UK AND USA (1996)
(comparing and contrasting the divergent evolution of the common law in the U.K. and U.S.).
100
See Miceli, supra note 85, at 165 (“[T]he law will converge on the efficient rule (or
diverge from it) more quickly as . . . the cost of abandoning precedent[ ] becomes
small . . . .”); Gennaioli & Shleifer, supra note 83, at 56 (arguing that if the initial legal
precedent is precise, the subsequent legal rules become more, and not less, precise).
96
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precedent.101 Consequently the value of precedent plays an important role.
Frequent defections from an established precedent undermine the process of
converging to efficiency. In the context of the common law jurisdictions,
there are important differences on how precedent is respected. U.S. judges
seem to be more willing to change precedent than the English judiciary as a
general observation (with particular reference to horizontal precedent).102
Again, if that is so, it seems likely that the American common law is less
likely to achieve efficiency than the English common law.
There are important implications from a model with a single efficient
equilibrium. The most immediate is that if doctrines and rules vary across
the common law jurisdictions, only one is efficient and the remaining failed
to achieve it. Given that the initial condition was presumably the same
(English law) we can conclude that some judicial intervention helps
efficiency but, under different conditions, judicial intervention is detrimental.
Another inference from this model is that the common law is efficient
only under certain conditions. Not all common law jurisdictions satisfy
those conditions, both in terms of judicial attributes and cost of changing
precedent. A comparison across common law jurisdictions demands a focus
on the local judiciary and the stickiness of precedent.
The consequences for the legal origins literature are quite obvious. A
single efficient equilibrium supports the idea of a one-size-fits-all approach.
However, the details are the conundrum in this context as what we have is
the potential efficiency of a specific common law system. At the same time,
there are clear prescriptions to improve the performance of each common
law institutional arrangement, in terms of reforming the judiciary and the
preponderance of precedent.
C. Putting Both Models Together
Combining the two possible models we have considered so far, we derive
a more complex and realistic overview of the efficiency hypothesis of the
common law. First, there is not a single efficient rule or doctrine, but a
multiplicity of possible equilibria depending on selective litigation. Second,
for each specific set of selective litigation, there is no guarantee that there
will be convergence to efficiency, depending on judicial attributes and the
preponderance of precedent.
101

See Wagenheim, supra note 79.
POSNER, supra note 99; see also E.M. Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21 WAYNE L.
REV. 1043, 1045–46 (1975) (finding that the American judiciary congratulated itself from
moving away from the strict English doctrine of precedent); Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in
Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV.
647, 664 n.84 (1999) (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court would have the power to
overrule itself on the horizontal plane).
102
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The most important consequence is that the identification of the
efficiency of the common law is much more intricate and multifaceted than
anticipated by the literature. A mere comparison of how a specific
predicament is addressed in each jurisdiction, as inspired by the legal origins
literature, is not only insufficient but also likely to produce gross mistakes.
The observation that each jurisdiction provides a different legal outcome
says very little about efficiency due to the existence of multiple efficient
solutions and because the variables that determine efficient outcomes vary.
A proper analysis requires a clear understanding of local determinants,
including judicial preferences, before we can jump to the conclusion that the
common law is undoubtedly efficient.
The next section introduces relevant examples to illustrate the difficulties
of the exercise. They show that once we depart from a general and
undefined efficiency hypothesis of the common law into specific doctrines
and rules, the analysis is complex, dense, and less clear than the legal origins
literature portrays. They also illustrate situations where multiple equilibria
are more likely and where a single efficient equilibrium is probable.
III. DISCUSSION OF EXAMPLES
We look at illustrative examples starting with tort law, generally
speaking, then the particularities of defamation and professional
responsibility, followed by cost rules in civil litigation (we argue this is a
good candidate for multiple equilibria), and conclude with civil juries (the
diversity in the use of civil juries seems to provide an excellent example of
an inefficient equilibrium). These examples are not exhaustive or suggested
to be representative. Our choice of tort and procedure is merely practical.
The differences across common law jurisdictions on tort law and procedure
are widely documented. At the same time, they easily relate to theoretical
and empirical literature in law and economics that is helpful in assessing the
plausibility of multiple efficient equilibria in the context of our discussion.
A. Tort Law
Tort law is one of the fields of law in which differences among common
law jurisdictions are more acute and significant. Even though they have an
identical origin in the old English common law, general theories on recovery
and judgments have evolved in a different way in each and every
jurisdiction. Clearly, all of them have in common the same foundational
legal authorities. For abnormally dangerous things or activities, all quote the
doctrine stated in Rylands v. Fletcher,103 an English decision rendered by the
103

Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.).
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House of Lords in 1868. The case established law according to which a
person who carries out an activity that substantially increases the probability
of causing harm to others assumes a stricter standard of liability.104 In the
same vein, common law jurisdictions share the doctrine of Davies v.
Mann.105 This is another important English case that established the last
clear chance doctrine, the most commonly accepted modification of the
contributory negligence rule.106 Likewise, it is needless to point out the great
influence of the English admiralty law in the general evolution of the
common law of torts.
Although the old common law has influenced all jurisdictions, it has also
grandfathered different and variable trends, especially regarding the
compensation of personal injuries.107 While some jurisdictions still apply the
general doctrines in a very similar way to their original conception, others
have established new doctrines based on punitive damages or even damages
calculated by caps.108
More specifically, while Canada, Ireland, Australia, and—obviously—the
United Kingdom have remained quite similar to the principles which inspired
the function of tort law institutions in early English law; other jurisdictions,
in particular New Zealand and the U.S., have experienced a deep
transformation in the last decades.109
In the vast sectors of the U.S. law culture, tort law has come under fire in
the last couple of years.110 The biases of the civil juries in tort cases, and the
104

For a general explanation on Rylands v. Fletcher, and other English cases related with the
origins of the strict liability doctrine, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 545–48 (5th ed. 1984).
105
Davies v. Mann, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex.).
106
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 104, at 462–64 (laying out the affirmative defense of the
last clear chance doctrine).
107
COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Sheila A.M. McLean
ed., 1993) (giving general background on the law of damages); TORT AND INSURANCE LAW
VOL. 4: COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Bernard A.
Koch & Helmut Koziol eds., 2003) [hereinafter TORT AND INSURANCE LAW] (giving general
background on the law of damages); see also Jeffrey O’Connell & David Partlett, An
America’s Cup for Tort Reform? Australia and America Compared, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
443, 445–54 (1988) (detailing the different avenues of tort reform).
108
O’Connell & Partlett, supra note 107.
109
For a general explanation of the evolution of the system, see G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT
LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (2003). For a survey of New Zealand tort law,
see Rosemary Tobin & Elsabe Schoeman, The New Zealand Accident Compensation Scheme:
The Statutory Bar and the Conflict of Laws, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 493 (2005) (detailing the New
Zealand accident compensation scheme).
110
See Frank B. Cross, Tort Law and the American Economy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 28, 47–50
(2011) (noting that the studies of tort law reform have been flawed). For a survey of judicial
opinions on tort law and reform, see Larry Lyon et al., Straight from the Horse’s Mouth:
Judicial Observations of Jury Behavior and the Need for Tort Reform, 59 BAYLOR L. REV.
419 (2007).
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alleged excessive amounts established in the context of punitive damages,
have promoted a general sense that a reform of the tort system is needed.111
Some U.S. jurisdictions have been named as “judicial hellholes” by the
American Tort Reform Association,112 a movement that reports on spurious
litigation in tort and promotes legal change in order to contain the increase of
damages.
In New Zealand, almost all personal injury damages actions are now
barred from reaching the courts. Since 1974, damages are decided by a
government agency, the Accident Compensation Corporation, which
promotes no-fault benefits for victims of accidents.113 The tasks of the
agency have been expanded to include more areas of the law in the last
decades. Its origins are linked to the damages due from labor accidents.
Like in the vast majority of jurisdictions (both common law and civil law),
damages are calculated on an objective basis previous to the claim being
filed. For example, New Zealand is establishing objective criteria for
medical malpractice claims.114 Damages are calculated by caps that
standardize compensations and bar the discussion on damages and
compensation in the courts of law.115
New Zealand has embraced a pure compensation system that completely
replaced the common law remedies for tort, an approach pursued by other
jurisdictions for workers’ compensation only.116 In fact, the Woodhouse
Report, so called in honor of the president of the commission that launched
the reform, began its discussion focused on the alternative ways to improve
111
For example, see Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL
360309 (N.M. Dist. Aug. 18, 1994), the so-called “McDonald’s Coffee Case,” where the jury
awarded $2.86 million to a woman who burned herself with a cup of coffee she purchased at a
McDonald’s restaurant. See Thomas S. Ulen, The View from Abroad: Tort Law and Liability
Insurance in the United States, in TORT LAW AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 207–38 (Gerhard
Wagner ed., 2005).
112
AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2011/2012 (2011), available at http://www.j
udicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Judicial-Hellholes-2011.pdf. The American Tort
Reform Association was founded in 1986. Since then it has focused on promoting the control—
even statutorily—of the damages award to plaintiffs in civil tort cases. About ATRA, ATRA.ORG,
http://www.atra.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
113
A complete study on the initial consequences of the reform can be found in GEOFFREY
PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY: A STUDY ON LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NEW
ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA (1979).
114
See generally Peter H. Schuck, Tort Reform, Kiwi-Style, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187
(2008) (describing New Zealand’s tort reform).
115
Some jurisdictions, including civil law countries, have followed the New Zealand example.
Spain, for instance, has since 1995 implemented a statutory cap system for calculating damages
for personal injuries caused by traffic accidents. Jesús Pintos Ager, Damage Schedules & Tort
Litigation in Spain 3–4 (InDret, Working Paper No. 131, 2003) (available at http://www.indret.
com/pdf/131_en.pdf).
116
PALMER, supra note 113; Schuck, supra note 114, at 188; Tobin & Schoeman, supra note
109, at 493.
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workers’ and road accident victim’s compensation schemes. At that point,
the members of the commission realized that spreading the system for all
personal injuries caused by accidents and criminal offenses would reduce
administrative costs.117 The most profound reform of the common law of
torts began as a political decision, but did not find antagonism among the
judiciary, and it has been fairly consensual in New Zealand.118
The abovementioned examples show how deep the differences are in tort
law within the common law jurisdictions.119 As we have mentioned before,
it is debatable that tort law evolves to efficiency.120 The different trends
followed in the common law jurisdictions make it even harder to talk about a
common law of torts (since they are remarkably different by now) and which
of them is more appropriate from an economic perspective. The creative
developments in New Zealand make this jurisdiction a clear outlier at the
moment.
Yet, from an economic perspective, there are significant
advantages (legal certainty, reduction of litigation costs) and important
disadvantages (inappropriate compensation, ossification of the law). It is
unclear if the New Zealand reform is efficient inasmuch as the common law
principles of tort law could be inefficient. In the following two subsections,
we look at further examples in detail.
B. Defamation Law
Defamation is a tort concerned with the publication of false defamatory
statements about another person that tend to injure a person’s reputation by
degrading them in the opinion of their neighbors or to make them
ridiculous.121 Defamation can be divided into libel, in which publication is in
a permanent form, and slander, which is oral publication.122 To find an
action for publication, the offending matter must be published with a third
party.123

117
Australia tried to enact a similar system. The proposal was, anyway, more comprehensive
than the New Zealand system, since Australians aimed to cover the whole population from any
personal injury. The proposal never reached the necessary parliamentary majority. For more
references on the New Zealand reform and the Australian proposals, see JOHN G. FLEMING, THE
LAW OF TORTS 374–78 (8th ed. 1992).
118
Id.
119
COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 107; TORT
AND INSURANCE LAW, supra note 107.
120
See Barzel, supra note 47, at 255 (noting that tort law, as a means to delineate rights,
tends towards inefficiency but never maintains a constant level of efficiency).
121
HENRY COLEMAN FOLKARD, THE LAW OF SLANDER AND LIBEL 1 (7th ed. 1908).
122
Id.
123
Id.
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The common law provides for the establishment of a defamation claim in
tort and the applicable defenses.124 However, judge-made law has
significantly changed defamation law in common law jurisdictions. In the
United States, libel law came under the influence of federal constitutional
law after 1964. In that year, in the case of New York Times v. Sullivan,125 the
United States Supreme Court ruled that state laws making newspapers
strictly liable for false defamatory statements were generally inconsistent
with First Amendment rights of freedom of press.126 The reasoning was as
follows: If public officials are allowed to recover damages for any false and
defamatory statement, regardless of the level of care taken, then newspapers
will be discouraged, or chilled, from printing stories on matters of public
interest. To moderate this chilling effect, the Supreme Court imposed a
standard of proof in libel cases involving public official plaintiffs which was
much higher than that used in most state courts at the time.127
The United Kingdom followed a different approach. The Defamation Act
1952 restated and clarified the common law principles of defamation.128 A
strict liability rule operates and damages are usually compensatory. In the
particular case of libel, no damage to the plaintiff has to be proved. In
slander, special damage must be proved except where the statement is an
imputation of a criminal offense.129 With the exception of the special
damage, the Defamation Act of 1952 was repealed and replaced by the
Defamation Act 1996 and the relevant parts of the Electronic Commerce
Regulations 2002.130 The new law was partially developed under the
influence of previous controversial case law and intended to limit claims of a
tort of defamation.131
Other common law jurisdictions have restated the common law principles
of the tort of defamation in their legislation, such as the New Zealand
Defamation Act 1992, the Irish Defamation Act 1961 and Defamation Act
2009, or the Australian model Defamation Act 2006.132 These statutes were
124

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: WITNESSES IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS § 558 (2011).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
126
Id. at 279.
127
Id. at 283.
128
Defamation Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz 2, c. 66, § 6 (Eng.), available at http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo6and1Eliz2/15-16/66.
129
Milner Frankum et al., United Kingdom, in 2 MEDIA, ADVERTISING, & ENTERTAINMENT
LAW THROUGHOUT THE WORLD ch. 36 (2010) [hereinafter 2 MEDIA, ADVERTISING, &
ENTERTAINMENT LAW].
130
Id.
131
Defamation Act, 1996, c. 31 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/19
96/31/data.pdf; Electronic Commerce Regulations, 2002, S.I. 2002/2555 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2002/2013/pdfs/uksi_20022013_en.pdf.
132
Defamation Act 1992 (N.Z.), available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1992/
0105/latest/DLM280687.html; Defamation Act 2009 (Act No. 31/2009) (Ir.), available at http://
125
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deeply influenced by controversial case law such as Oceanic Sun Line
Special Shipping Co. v. Fay or Gutnick v. Down Jones & Co. in Australia.133
In Canada, defamation law is regulated by provincial statutes that have been
shaped by legal doctrines developed by the Supreme Court of Canada in
salient cases such as Hill v. Church of Scientology.134
The significant difference between the United States and the remaining
common law jurisdictions is the more generous treatment of defendants in
the United States.135 Libel law deals with a clash of two important values:
freedom of speech and freedom from defamation. The proper balance
between these goals has been debated in economics. It is unclear if the
American model is closer to efficiency than the traditional common law
approach.136 Significant differences between the political system, the media
industry, or the prevalence of corruption could suggest that the different
approaches can be equally efficient depending on local needs.
C. Professional Responsibility
Under the traditional principles of the common law, lawyers acting as
advocates have professional immunity and could not be sued for professional
responsibility. The immunity for misconduct tort litigation was established
in the eighteenth century. Although the scope and justification for the
immunity have evolved in case law due to public policy considerations, it
www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2009/en.act.2009.0031.pdf; Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s. 25
(Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nt/num_act/da20068o2006145/.
133
Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co. v Fay [1988] 165 CLR 197 (Austl.); Down Jones
& Co. v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 (Austl.).
134
Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (Can.).
135
Frankum et al., supra note 129; William L. Northcote & Christopher M. Schiffmann,
Canada, in 1 MEDIA, ADVERTISING, & ENTERTAINMENT LAW THROUGHOUT THE WORLD ch. 6
(2010) [hereinafter 1 MEDIA, ADVERTISING, & ENTERTAINMENT LAW]; Paul Kirton, Australia,
in 1 MEDIA, ADVERTISING, & ENTERTAINMENT LAW, supra, ch. 6; Andrew Fawcett et al., New
Zealand, in 2 MEDIA, ADVERTISING, & ENTERTAINMENT LAW, supra note 129, ch. 27 (2010);
Jonathan Kelly et al., Ireland, in 2 MEDIA, ADVERTISING, & ENTERTAINMENT LAW, supra note
129, ch. 17.
136
See Nuno Garoupa, The Economics of Political Dishonesty and Defamation, 19 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 167 (1999) (arguing that tabloids are better informed than society and can
provide an auditing role in preventing political corruption so long as they are deterred from
defamation); Nuno Garoupa, Dishonesty and Libel Law: The Economics of the “Chilling”
Effect, 155 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 284 (1999) (arguing that the plaintiff
winning a defamation suit is not a problem if the media can distinguish between honesty and
dishonesty); OREN BAR-GILL & ASSAF HAMDANI, OPTIMAL LIABILITY FOR LIBEL 6 (2003)
(demonstrating an alternative model of libel); Manoj Dalvi & James F. Refalo, An Economic
Analysis of Libel Law, 34 E. ECON. J. 74 (2008) (describing another model of liberal law); Ido
Baum et al., Reporter’s Privilege and Incentives to Leak, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 701 (2009)
(demonstrating that reporters have demonstrable incentives to report leaks, as defamation
lawsuits rarely succeed).
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was largely confirmed by the House of Lords in Rondel v. Worsley137 and in
Saif Ali v. Sydney Smith Mitchell & Co.138 However, more recently, in
Arthur J.S. Hall & Co. v. Simons, the House of Lords has significantly
eroded the immunity to the point of effective abolishment by reinforcing the
professional duty to the court.139 Unlike the House of Lords, the Australian
High Court has confirmed the professional immunity for lawyers, as seen in
the important case of D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid.140 The
professional immunity was never recognized in Canada or in the United
States. The main reasoning seems to be that there was no formal distinction
between barrister and solicitor in these jurisdictions.
Although there are important differences in the structure of the legal
profession in common law jurisdictions, they do not seem to be a persuasive
argument to justify the different approaches from an efficiency perspective.
It seems unlikely, from an economic perspective, that a no liability rule can
be efficient. Therefore, not only does the traditional principle of immunity in
common law seem unlikely to be efficient, but this also presents a case of
inefficient persistence.
D. Cost Rules in Civil Litigation
The allocation of costs is critically important for civil litigation. In the
United Kingdom, the so-called English rule largely prevails.141 The general
rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the
successful party. However, the award of costs at the conclusion of a case is
at the discretion of the court. The discretion extends to whether the costs are
payable by one party to another, the amount of those costs, and when they
are to be paid. In deciding what order they need to make about costs, the
court must give regard to all the circumstances including the conduct of the
parties.142
In Canada, a rule of shifting of costs in litigation by which the loser in a
civil lawsuit must compensate the winner for a portion of the latter’s legal
costs is also applied.143 Generally speaking, costs do not amount to full
compensation, and the proportion of the winner’s legal bill covered by an
137

[1960] 1 A.C. 191 (H.L.).
[1980] A.C. 198 (H.L.).
139
Arthur J.S. Hall & Co. v Simons, [2002] 1 A.C. (H.L.) 615.
140
D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid, [2005] 223 HCA 12 (Austl.).
141
See also discussion by Paul Hopkins, The Success of Mediation in the UK, in ADR
CLIENT STRATEGIES IN THE UK: LEADING LAWYERS ON PREPARING CLIENTS, NAVIGATING THE
NEGOTIATION PROCESS, AND OVERCOMING OBSTACLES 145 (2008).
142
Civil Procedure Rules and Directions, pt. 44 (U.K.), available at http://www.justice.gov.
uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/pdf/parts/part44.pdf.
143
Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 57 (Can.).
138
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award of costs typically decreases over time as legal fees continue to rise.
Yet, since the nature of the rule remains informal and discretionary, litigants
cannot fully rely upon its application when deciding whether or not to
litigate. The decision to award costs is made at the conclusion of the action,
which means a plaintiff still risks a substantial loss if the claim is ultimately
unsuccessful.
“Both Australia and New Zealand follow the English civil rule . . . unless
the successful party has in some way behaved improperly in the course of the
litigation.”144 The same applies in Ireland where, as a general rule, the loser
pays the costs.145 The right to an order in these circumstances is not
absolute, however, and the court can exercise its discretion based upon the
facts of the particular case.146
In contrast, in the United States each side generally bears its own costs,
the so-called American rule.147 Notice that the English rule prevailed in the
U.S. until the nineteenth century.148 The American rule was developed as
lawyers gained the power to negotiate their contracts in a fairly unregulated
framework. It became dominant by the 1850s.149 However, variants of a
loser-pays-all rule still exist in federal civil procedure, namely Rule 68 of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by which a party might have to reimburse
the costs of the other party if the award is less than a rejected offer of
settlement (a similar rule has been adopted in England and Wales after the
Woolf reforms to civil procedure in 1996).150 In many cases, the court is
allowed to order the losing side to pay the legal costs of the winner; however,
this is often subject to the discretion of the judge.151
There is an extensive literature on the American versus English rule in
civil litigation. There is no consensus in the theoretical literature concerning
the overall effect of shifting litigation costs.152 The controversial topics
include the extent to which shifting costs promote settlement,153 enhance
144
Ian Freckelton, Judicial Attitudes Toward Scientific Evidence: The Antipodean
Experience, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1142 (1997).
145
MELODY BUCKLEY, CIVIL PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE (2004).
146
Id.
147
LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 30, at 1050.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
HARRY WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (1996), available at http://webarchive.nationalarch
ives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/contents.htm.
151
For some versions of fee-shifting in specific circumstances, see FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4),
26(g)(3), 37, 41(d)(1).
152
Hugh Gravelle, The Efficiency Implications of Cost-Shifting Rules, 13 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 3, 3 (1993); see also Ronald Braeutigam et al., An Economic Analysis of Alternative
Fee Shifting Systems, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 181–82 (1984) (explaining that the
glut of assumptions required by fee-shifting analysis make reaching clear conclusions
difficult).
153
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15
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civil litigation,154 favor more meritorious claims or decrease the number of
nuisance lawsuits.155 The results depend on asymmetric information,156 risk
aversion,157 strategic positions158 and other procedural rules.159 The
empirical and experimental literature does not seem to be conclusive.160
It is clear that the English rule tends to prevail in common law
jurisdictions.161 The United States deviated from the general trend in the
nineteenth century.162 The evolution of the rules concerning cost allocation
could be a good example of multiple equilibria where the final outcome is
determined by local determinants. The different structure of the legal
markets, the practice of contingency fees (largely confined to the United
States until recently),163 and the needs posed by different rates of growing
civil litigation could easily determine the appropriate use of different rules.164
RAND J. ECON. 404, 404 (1984).
154
Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 72 (1982) (explaining that
British and American rules may interact with other factors to influence “social welfare relative
to the goal of achieving an appropriate volume of litigation”).
155
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the
Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 371, 372 (1996).
156
Keith N. Hylton, An Asymmetric-Information Model of Litigation, 22 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 153 (2002).
157
Shavell, supra note 154, at 57–58.
158
Hylton, supra note 156, at 154.
159
Brian G.M. Main & Andrew Park, The Impact of Defendant Offers into Court on
Negotiation in the Shadow of the Law: Experimental Evidence, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 177,
178 (2002) (noting the existence of procedural arrangements specifically designed to influence
settlement that can influence the choice of cost-shifting rule); Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis
L. Wilde, Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs, 17 RAND J. ECON.
557 (1986); John C. Hause, Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I’ll Be Suing You, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 157 (1989); Louis Kaplow, Shifting Plaintiffs’ Fees Versus Increasing Damage
Awards, 24 RAND J. ECON. 625 (1993); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Optimal
Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs, 27 RAND
J. ECON. 269 (1996); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel Rubinfeld, Does the English Rule
Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 519 (1998).
160
Compare Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal
Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345, 377–78 (concluding that the
English rule reduces overall litigation and encourages settlement), and Main & Park, supra
note 159, at 188 (concluding that the English rule has little impact on “propensity to settle”),
with Brian G.M. Main & Andrew Park, An Experiment with Two-Way Offers into Court:
Restoring the Balance in Pre-Trial Negotiation, 30 J. ECON. STUD. 125, 139–40 (2003)
(concluding that English rule may reduce settlement but ultimately has highly variable
effects).
161
Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does the
Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1946 (2002).
162
LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 30, at 105.
163
Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Nonconveniens Analysis, 77 TUL. L.
REV. 309, 346 (2002).
164
The consideration of variants does not change the conclusions of our analysis. For

2012]

THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMON LAW AND EFFICIENCY

335

E. Civil Juries
Whereas the United States continues to use of civil juries, their use has
drastically declined over the past decades in the U.K.,165 Australia,166 New
Zealand,167 Canada,168 and Ireland.169 “Until the mid-nineteenth century, jury
trial was the only form of trial in the common law courts, and until the early
twentieth century, it continued to predominate for civil as well as criminal
cases.”170 The civil jury has largely disappeared in England and Wales, and
the right to a jury in criminal cases has been significantly reduced as well.171
In the U.K. “[t]oday, less than one percent of civil trials are jury trials”; such
trials are limited to cases of libel and slander, fraud, malicious prosecution,
and false imprisonment as defined by the Supreme Court Act.172 However,
even in these limited cases, the trial judge has the discretion to deny the right
to a jury if the case is particularly complex.173 In Ward v. James, the Court
of Appeal held that a single judge should hear all personal injury litigation
unless there were special considerations.174
In England and Wales, civil juries are most frequently used in defamation
cases. The frequent large awards decided by juries have been a matter of
controversy. In 1995, the Court of Appeal in John v. MGN Ltd. ruled to curb
examples of such variants, consider Janice Toran, Settlement, Sanctions, and Attorney Fees:
Comparing English Payment into Court and Proposed Rule 68, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 301, 304,
308 (1985–1986), citing U.S. Federal Rule 68 and the English practice of payment into court
as rules that shift costs based on the failure to achieve settlement; or Bebchuk & Chang, supra
note 155, at 372, citing Federal Rule 11 as a rule shifting costs based on the margin of victory.
Also, the fact that American states have variants of the English rule under some conditions;
see for example Main & Park, supra note 159, at 178 & n.3, which does not undermine our
conclusion.
165
Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Cheryl Thomas, Decline of the “Little Parliament”: Juries and
Jury Reform in England and Wales, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 7 (1999).
166
Michael Chesterman, Criminal Trial Juries in Australia: From Penal Colonies to a
Federal Democracy, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 69 n.1 (1999).
167
Neil Cameron et al., The New Zealand Jury, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 138
(1999).
168
W.A. Bogart, “Guardian of Civil Rights . . . Medieval Relic”: The Civil Jury in Canada,
62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305, 305 (1999).
169
John D. Jackson et al., The Jury System in Contemporary Ireland: In the Shadow of a
Troubled Past, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 203 (1999).
170
Bostock & Thomas, supra note 165, at 9.
171
Neil Vidmar, A Historical and Comparative Perspective on the Common Law Jury, in
WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 1, 7 (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000); Oscar G. Chase, American
“Exceptionalism” and Comparative Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 288–89 (2002).
172
Bostock & Thomas, supra note 165, at 13; Marc Galanter, The Civil Jury as Regulator of
the Litigation Process, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 201, 202 (1990) (“In England, a series of
restrictions reduced the use of juries from 100 percent of civil trials in 1854 to two percent a
century later.”).
173
Bostock & Thomas, supra note 165, at 13.
174
Ward v. James, [1966] 1 Q.B. 273 (Eng.).
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excessive jury awards by altering jury instructions.175 The Defamation Act
of 1996 further curtailed the role of juries in libel cases, establishing a
summary procedure whereby judges, not juries, can dispose of libel claims
up to £10,000.176 The Court of Appeal has also issued guidelines on the
directions given to juries assessing damages in cases of wrongful arrest and
malicious prosecution brought against the police.177 Case law, reinforced by
specific statute law, has essentially eliminated civil juries in the U.K.178
In Australia, civil juries are still available in all of the states except South
Australia, but are rarely used outside New South Wales and Victoria.179
Furthermore, trial by jury in Australian civil matters has substantially
declined in the last decades.180 Today, Australian judges decide the large
majority of civil cases.181 It is rare, particularly following recent legislative
reforms to tort law, for a jury to decide a civil case.182 In Australian
jurisdictions without legislative mandates abolishing juries in civil actions,
legislation “tends to allow the parties to opt for trial by jury . . . but maintains
the court’s discretion to control that choice.”183 “[T]he courts have discretion
to order jury trials for certain types of lawsuits, such as defamation, fraud,
false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and motor vehicle accidents.”184
175

[1997] Q.B. 586 (Eng.).
Defamation Act, 1996, c. 31, §§ 8–9.
177
Thompson v. Comm’r of Police of the Metropolis, [1997] 2 All E.R. 762 (Eng.).
178
Lewis N. Klar, The Impact of the U.S. Tort Law in Canada, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 359, 366
(2011); see also Senior Courts Act, 1981, § 69 (U.K.) (limiting trial by jury to judicial
acknowledgement of a claim of fraud, libel, slander, malicious prosecution, or false
imprisonment). Although the frequency of civil jury trials has been reduced, Scotland utilizes
civil juries most frequently. Civil juries were abolished in the Sheriff Court, which is the
lower of the civil courts. In the Court of Session, the higher civil court, some civil actions for
personal injury damages and defamation are still tried by jury. Court of Session Act (1988)
§ 11 (U.K.). Section 11 replaced its outdated counterpart in the Court of Session Act (1825)
§ 11 (U.K.), and removed from the ambit of jury trial a large number of types of actions,
which, in practice, never went to a jury. Peter Duff, The Scottish Criminal Jury: A Very
Peculiar Institution, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 174 (1999).
179
Michael Tilbury & Harold Luntz, Punitive Damages in Australian Law, 17 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 769, 775–76 (1995).
180
S. Stuart Clark, Thinking Locally, Suing Globally: The International Frontiers of Mass
Tort Litigation in Australia, 74 DEF. COUNS. J. 139 (2007).
181
See, e.g., Tilbury & Luntz, supra note 179, at 776 (stating “the majority of civil actions
[in Australia] do not use juries”); Kylie Burns, The Role of the Judiciary: Passive or Active?,
LEGALDATE, May 2006, at 4 (“Judges now decide the vast majority of court cases in
Australia.”); Jacqueline Horan, Perceptions of the Civil Jury System, 31 MONASH U. L. REV.
120, 120 (2005) (noting that “[t]here is an Australia-wide trend of reducing the right to civil
jury trial”).
182
Burns, supra note 181.
183
Tilbury & Luntz, supra note 179, at 775–76; see also Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd.
(2002) 2009 CLR 478, 507 (Austl.) (disputing that civil jury trials cost more and take longer).
184
Lucille M. Ponte, Reassessing the Australian Adversarial System: An Overview of Issues
in Court Reform and Federal ADR Practice in the Land Down Under, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT’L
176
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However, courts will rarely order a jury trial in strictly commercial
disputes.185 Australian jury trials are “almost always reserved for more
serious criminal matters.”186 The profound difference in the way the U.S.
and Australia treat civil juries has been recognized by the literature.187
Civil juries are also rarely used in New Zealand.188 The Supreme Court
Act of 1841 established a right to jury trial in all civil cases.189 In 1860, the
Supreme Court ruled that parties could consent to having judges alone
determine issues of fact.190 From 1862 to 1977, “minor jury sittings” (began
with six jurors but shifted to four jurors prior to abolishment) were
established for cases under £100 in value and were used at the discretion of
the trial judge.191 Currently, the High Court provides the right to civil jury
trial in most cases at the request of either party.192 Nevertheless, civil jury
trials are so rare in practice that the Department for Courts no longer even
keeps statistics on it. When implemented, civil juries are largely confined to
defamation and personal injury cases, and are sometimes used in actions
against governmental bodies.193 However, “New Zealand effectively
abolished juries in personal injury cases in 1972 by adopting a no-fault
compensation system that replaced litigation.”194 In New Zealand, we could
L. & COM. 335, 340 n.38 (2000).
185
William Gummow, The Injunction in Aid of Legal Rights—An Australian Perspective,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 85 (1993).
186
Burns, supra note 181.
187
See, e.g., Gerald Walpin, America’s Failing Civil Justice System: Can We Learn from
Other Countries?, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 647, 652 (1997) (comparing the approach of
Australian and American legal systems to civil jury trials very briefly); Caroline Forell,
Statutes and Torts: Comparing the United States to Australia, Canada, and England, 36
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 865, 872 (2000) (noting that Australia appears to be headed in the
direction of eliminating jury involvement in nearly all tort claims); Steven T. Masada,
Australia’s “Most Extreme Case”: A New Alternative for U.S. Medical Malpractice Liability
Reform, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 163, 180, 193 (2004) (suggesting that the U.S. legal
system should adopt several reforms modeled after the Australian legal system, including the
Australian approach to civil juries: “Australia does not use civil juries and attorneys are
compensated according to an hourly wage—two features that help reduce litigation, judicial
backlog, and the high costs associated with the American civil system.”).
188
Cameron et al., supra note 167, at 103.
189
Supreme Court Act 1841, § 19 (N.Z.).
190
Supreme Court Act 1860, § 22 (N.Z.).
191
Supreme Court Act Amendment Act 1862, § 8 (N.Z.) (“The following classes of [c]ases
may be tried at the “Minor Jury Sittings” . . . [for] [i]nquiries of damages . . . not exceed[ing]
One hundred pounds.”); id. § 10 (“At any such ‘Minor Jury Sittings’ . . . the Judge
presiding . . . may try and decide any issue of fact which he is by law empowered to try.”); id.
§ 12 (“The Jury at such Sittings shall consist of six Jurors.”); Judicature Amendment Act
1977, § 9 (“Juries of 4 abolished.”).
192
Judicature Act 1908, §§ 19A, 19B (N.Z.).
193
Neil Cameron et al., The New Zealand Jury: Towards Reform, in WORLD JURY SYSTEMS,
supra note 171, at 167, 178.
194
Scott Brister, The Decline in Jury Trials: What Would Wal-Mart Do?, 47 S. TEX. L. REV.
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say that there is still a theoretical right to a jury trial in civil cases, but such
right is rarely used in practice.195
As with other common law jurisdictions, civil juries exist on the
periphery in Canada.196 In some Canadian jurisdictions the use of civil juries
has been highly curtailed while in other jurisdictions it has been outright
abolished.197 Canadian courts retain the right to interfere with the judgment
of a jury once it has reached a verdict;198 however, judges usually show great
deference to the jury’s verdict.199 Juries are most often used in motor vehicle
accident litigation and are frequently sought by institutional parties.200 They
are most prevalent in Ontario.201 Courts most often strike civil juries if the
factual issues of a case are unduly complex.202 Additionally, the Supreme
Court held in 1997 that judges have the discretion to determine whether to
strike a civil jury if jurors can reasonably infer that a defendant was insured
against a finding of liability.203
Civil jury trials have almost entirely disappeared in Ireland.204 In the
Republic of Ireland, civil juries are retained only for libel, slander, assault,
and false imprisonment cases; in Northern Ireland, civil juries are retained
only for libel claims or if the judge accedes to a particular application.205
191, 194 (2005).
195
Cameron et al., supra note 167, at 112.
196
Galanter, supra note 172, at 202.
197
Bogart, supra note 168, at 305; see also Neil Vidmar, Foreword, 62 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1, 1–2 (1999) (recognizing the existence of the civil jury system in Canada).
198
See Babyn v. Patel [1997] A.J. No. 261 (Alta. Q.B.) (striking the jury because of difficult
issues of causation and the likelihood of conflicting expert testimony); Taguchi v. Stuparyk
[1993] A.J. No. 843 (Alta. Q.B.) (striking the jury because the trial would involve lengthy
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It is clear that the U.S. has not followed the path of other common law
jurisdictions in eliminating or drastically reducing the use of civil juries.206
In fact, legal scholars have suggested the advantages of following the
Australian or the English models in the United States.207 The economic
literature has considered the multiple implications of using civil juries,
including legal certainty, the impact on awards, the development of
procedural rules, and the potential additional litigation costs.208 Both at the
theoretical and at the empirical level, it is unclear if the use of civil juries is
economically efficient.209
More fundamentally, it is difficult to see how civil juries should be
efficient in the United States but not in the other common law jurisdictions
nowadays. It is clear that all common law jurisdictions initially had civil
juries, and most have abandoned such institution because of legal costs and
uncertainty. However, given the role of civil juries in the United States, it is
unclear how the efficiency hypothesis could explain the different paths taken.
It could be the case that the U.S. is behind the other jurisdictions in the
evolutionary process, and so it is just a matter of time that civil juries are
abolished in the United States. Such would be the most reasonable
prediction under the efficiency hypothesis of the common law.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This Article has discussed the efficiency hypothesis of the common law
from the perspective of comparative law. We argue that the general
treatment of this hypothesis by legal economists leaves unanswered many
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questions regarding the significant variations across the common law
jurisdictions.
By making use of the mathematical models developed by legal
economists to explain the efficiency hypothesis of the common law, we
analyzed two different problems. First, there is not a single efficient rule or
doctrine, but a multiplicity of possible equilibria depending on selective
litigation. Second, for each specific set of selective litigation, there is no
guarantee that there will be convergence to efficiency, depending on judicial
attributes and the preponderance of precedent.
The identification of the efficiency of the common law is much more
intricate and multifaceted than anticipated by the literature. A mere
comparison of how a specific predicament is addressed in each jurisdiction,
as inspired by the legal origins literature, is not only insufficient, but likely to
produce gross mistakes. The observation that each jurisdiction provides a
different legal outcome says very little about efficiency. First, there are
multiple efficient legal solutions. Second, the variables that determine
efficient outcomes vary significantly across the common law jurisdictions
(England and Wales, U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland). A
proper analysis requires a clear understanding of local determinants,
including judicial preferences, before we can jump to the conclusion that the
common law is undoubtedly efficient (or more precisely, which common law
is undoubtedly efficient).
Our thesis has been illustrated with a detailed discussion of some relevant
examples: tort law, defamation law, professional responsibility, allocation of
costs in civil litigation, and civil juries. These examples are not exhaustive
or suggested to be representative; they are merely good starting points for an
important academic discussion. They show that once we depart from
generalities into specific doctrines and rules, the analysis is complex, dense
and less clear than the legal origins literature tends to portray.

